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2.   LITERATURE REVIEW

                  Previous Studies
                  Strong  governance  mechanisms  can  create  strong  and  deeply  rooted  trust  among  all  stakeholders.  Pension  fund
                  governance involves managerial control and organizational rules based on accountability and management oversight
                  itself (Chohan, 2017). Therefore, companies must include risk-based measures that capture changes or uncertainties
                  in  the  future. This  is  shown  by  the  more  sophisticated  the  investment  strategy  of  pension  funds,  the  tighter  the
                  management and supervision are. One of the governance mechanisms is through the roles that the Board of Directors
                  has. In this case, the board of directors is responsible for creating value and protecting shareholder assets. Ambachtsheer
                  et al. (2006) in (Chohan, 2017) explains that pension fund researches indicate the Board of Directors has a vital role to
                  ensure the governance and the investment are working properly.


                  Research on pension funds is assorted but the research on governance and investment asset allocation for pension
                  funds is inadequate. Previous studies on investment discussed more in terms of optimizing the results of the investment
                  portfolio. Several studies outside Indonesia that discuss pension fund governance include Kowalewski (2012) which
                  examines the impact of governance on the performance of defined contribution pension funds. Kowalewski (2012)
                  divides  governance  mechanisms  into  external,  internal,  and  other  governance  mechanisms.  External  governance
                  mechanisms such as changes in the number of pension fund memberships that are not related to past pension fund
                  performance. Internal governance mechanisms such as the structure and characteristics of the board of directors have
                  a significant effect on the measure of the profitability of pension funds (measured by Return on Assets and Return on
                  Equity).
                  Research  on  pension  fund  governance  in  Indonesia  was  conducted  by  Suharno  (2015)  with  the  findings  that  the
                  management and supervisory board have not fully carried out their functions and responsibilities, especially non-
                  operational administrators, most of whose time is spent on carrying out their functions and responsibilities at the
                  employer; pension funds do not have a reward and punishment system to measure performance, the management has
                  not made a written review of investment placements and disbursements; and pension funds do not have a special unit
                  that is responsible for internal supervision.


                  Research on investment asset allocation was carried out by Soelaiman (2015). Her research aims to determine the
                  suitability of the pension fund investment portfolio allocation with the Liability Driven Investment (LDI) strategy, the
                  increase in investment returns after the strategy is implemented, and the impact of this strategy on the level of fund
                  adequacy. Her research shows that the portfolio allocation is following this strategy, an increase in investment returns
                  using this strategy, and an increase in the funding ratio. The difference between this study and previous studies is that
                  this study also discusses the application of the code of ethics by AKM Pension Fund in addition to the implementation
                  of the basic principles of pension fund governance.

                  Agency Theory
                  Agency theory is one of the theories applied to corporate governance. The theory developed by Jensen & Meckling
                  (1976) describes a contract that describes one or more shareholders (principal) involving management (agent) to
                  perform several services. This agency relationship arises when shareholders hire management to work for them and
                  agents act in the best interests of shareholders.

                  Good governance in the regulation of pension funds itself must be established with the assumption that there is a
                  principal and agent relationship that must be led by a sense of duty and trust (Clark (2004) in (Chohan (2017)). Agency
                  problems in pension funds can occur if pension fund participants may want to allocate their pension funds to long-
                  term instruments to obtain higher benefit but fund managers allocate them to short-term instruments for short-term
                  gains.













                                                                                 International Conference on Sustainability  79
                                                                                 (5  Sustainability Practitioner Conference)
                                                                                  Th
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